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COMMENTS
A CALL TO CONGRESS TO AMEND ERISA PREEMP-
TION OF HMO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: THE
DISSATISFACTORY DISTINCTION BETWEEN QUALITY
AND QUANTITY OF CARE
"In effect, the ERISA provisions which overrule state law
mean that the majority of Americans have been stripped of their
historical legal protections against injury or death resulting from
the actions of health insurance companies."1
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 3, 1991, eleven-year-old Paige Lancaster went
to her Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) clinic, Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. (Kaiser),
where she saw pediatric physician Dr. Corder Campbell for nau-
sea and severe daily headaches. 2 Dr. Campbell only treated Paige
as a pediatric patient and did not administer any diagnostic
tests.3 Although Paige visited Kaiser's clinic for the next five
years to be treated by Dr. Campbell and Dr. L. Pauls for recurring
headaches, the physicians continued to treat her with adult
strength narcotic pain medication.4 They never sought the advice
of a neurological specialist, nor did they recommend any diagnos-
tic test to determine the cause of the child's symptoms. 5 On May
13, 1996, approximately five years after Paige's initial visit to Kai-
1. Stephenie Overman, Legislation Seeking to Close Loophole Protecting
HMO's From Liability Suits, PHYs. FIN. NEWS, May 15, 1997, at 34 (quoting
House Representative Charlie Norwood (R-Ga) who proposed the Patient Access
to Responsible Care Act of 1997 in response to managed care liability issues
under ERISA).
2. Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958
F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (E.D. Va. 1997).
3. Id. at 1139-40.
4. Id. at 1140.
5. Id.
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ser clinic, physicians suggested that Paige undergo both an EEG
and MRI.6 The tests were recommended only because Paige's
school psychologist wrote the Kaiser physicians about Paige's
deteriorating academic performance, vomiting, blood-shot eyes,
and severe headaches.7 The tests revealed that Paige had a fron-
tal tumor and cystic mass that covered over forty percent of her
brain.' As a result, she has undergone several brain surgeries as
well as radiation therapy. 9
Paige's parents sued Kaiser physicians Dr. Corder Campbell
and Dr. L. Pauls, as well as the HMO, Kaiser, in state court.1 ° Dr.
Campbell and Dr. Pauls were under contract with Kaiser to pro-
vide medical services to Kaiser participants at clinics owned by
Kaiser." Paige's membership in Kaiser was paid for by an
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan through
her father's employment.' 2 The law suit alleged vicarious liability
claims against Kaiser for the negligence of Dr. Campbell and Dr.
Pauls.' 3 In addition, the law suit alleged direct liability claims for
both: (1) Kaiser's failure to establish guidelines for the appropri-
ate treatment of Paige's headaches; and (2) Kaiser's establishment
of an Incentive Program which prevented the adequate and timely
treatment of Paige's brain tumor.' 4 Under the Incentive Program,
Kaiser physicians received bonuses for avoiding costly treatment
and tests.' 5
Defendants removed the action to federal court under an
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the doctrine of com-
plete preemption, which allows removal of state claims to federal
court when the claims conflict with federal law.'6 The United
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1140.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1139.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1141.
14. Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
15. Id. at 1140.
16. Id. at 1138-39, 1141 ("In the ERISA context, the Supreme Court
determined that the complete preemption doctrine supports removal of state
causes of action that fit within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision
.... " Id. at 1143.). Here, the plaintiffs claims fallwithin the scope of ERISA's
civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), and therefore qualify for removal to
federal court. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66
(1987) (holding that because of the clear intent of Congress to make causes of
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dis-
missed the plaintiffs direct liability claims, stating that they were
preempted by ERISA, and remanded the vicarious liability claims
to the Circuit Court of Prince William County, Virginia. 17 The
vicarious liability claims, however, are subject to Virginia's medi-
cal malpractice law, which does not allow recovery for damages
beyond one million dollars.' 8
The different treatment accorded to patients who belong to
employee group health plans that are governed by ERISA and
those who are not enrolled in ERISA plans is apparent when con-
trasting Lancaster with Fox v. Healthnet.'9 In Fox, Mrs. Fox and
her husband brought suit against their HMO, Healthnet, claiming
direct liability for denying her bone marrow transplant.2 ° Instead
of dismissing the direct liability claim as the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia did in Paige Lan-
caster's suit, the jury awarded the plaintiffs 89 million dollars.21
In cases where an ERISA plan is involved, specifically those like
Lancaster, in which a managed care organization is directly negli-
gent or those in which the managed care organization's actions
amount to a denial of benefits, a plaintiff will not recover at all.22
action under ERISA civil enforcement provisions removable to federal court, a
preemption defense provides a basis for removal to federal court notwithstanding
the well-pleaded complaint rule). See also infra notes 56-60 and accompanying
text (discussing the complete preemption doctrine).
17. Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1150-51.
18. Id. at 1150-51, 1151 n.48.
19. No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside City 1993).
20. Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Patrick D. Seiter, Health Plan Liability in the Age
of Managed Care, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 191, 193 (1995) (citing Fox, No. 219692).
21. Id. at 199 (recognizing that "[tihis difference in outcomes, based solely on
whether benefits were provided through a privately sponsored ERISA plan or a
publicly sponsored non-ERISA plan, begs for legislative resolution"). See also
Laura H. Harshbarger, ERISA Preemption Meets the Age of Managed Care:
Toward a Comprehensive Social Policy, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 191, 198 (1996)
(noting that the 89 million dollar award is the largest medical malpractice award
against an HMO).
22. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that the direct liability claim, not the vicarious liability claim, related to
the plaintiffs employee benefit plan and was preempted by ERISA); Tolton v.
American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that American
Biodyne's benefit determinations in refusing to authorize psychiatric benefits
prior to utilization review related to an employee benefit plan and were
preempted by ERISA); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that ERISA preempted a state law claim for wrongful death because it
was a claim that Aetna was negligent in administering benefits); Kuhl v. Lincoln
1998] 295
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Recovery is denied in these cases regardless of whether ERISA
preempts a plaintiffs state law claim and regardless of whether
plaintiffs, such as Fox, who are not enrolled in ERISA plans can
bring suit under state law.23
The Fox and Lancaster rulings also differ in the amounts
recoverable by an injured plaintiff. In Fox, the plaintiffs were
awarded 89 million dollars, 77 million dollars of which was for
punitive damages alone.24 Since the plaintiffs' health plan was
not governed by ERISA, the managed care organization was sub-
ject to suit for all types of compensation available under state law.
However, as in Lancaster, where an ERISA plan is involved, the
plaintiff may only recover for the amount of benefits that were
denied under the ERISA plan.25 ERISA does not permit other
types of compensatory or punitive damages, such as damages for
unreasonable delay or pain and suffering.26
Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the actions of Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City in refusing to pre-
approve heart surgery amounted to a denial of benefits, and, thus, the plaintiffs
claims were preempted by ERISA); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that ERISA preempts plaintiffs direct
negligence claim, but not its vicarious liability claim).
23. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir.
1992) (The "absence of a remedy under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme for
medical malpractice committed in connection with a plan benefit determination
does not alter our conclusion. While we are not unmindful of the fact that our
interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies within a statute
intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans [citations omitted], the
lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a preemption analysis."). See also
Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 248 (5th Cir.
1990) ("We have held under different circumstances that ERISA preemption may
occur even though ERISA itself could not offer an aggrieved employee a remedy
for alleged misrepresentations.").
24. Conrad & Seiter, supra note 20, at 193 (citing Fox, No. 219692).
25. See infra note 41 and text (discussing ERISA's enforcement section,
§ 502(a)(1)(B), which limits a beneficiary's remedies to "recover[ing] benefits due
to him under the terms of the plan, to enforc[ing] his rights under the terms of
the plan, or to clarify[ing] his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan"). See also Michael Higgins, Increased Exposure For HMOs: Texas Law
Allows Patients to Sue; Health Plans Will Wage Preemption Battle, A.B.A. J.,
September 1997 at 24 (noting that plaintiffs in ERISA plans can only receive
damages for the cost of the treatment that they were denied by their HMO).
26. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-262 (1993) (holding that
compensatory and punitive damages are not available under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B)). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. 58 (explaining that
the federal scheme of ERISA would be undermined if ERISA-plan participants
were able to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA);
296 [Vol. 20:293
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This Comment begins with an overview of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the preemption
clause found therein. Section III explains the distinction between
quality and quantity of care, the test many courts have relied on
to determine whether ERISA preempts a medical malpractice
claim. Section IV examines state common law theories of liability
which are asserted against managed care organizations, specifi-
cally claims of direct and vicarious liability. Section V addresses
the HMO's role in medical decision making, and Section VI
describes recent legislation regarding ERISA and HMO liability.
This Comment contends that the more active role an HMO has
regarding the quality of care they offer, the more they should be
subject to vicarious and direct liability for negligent provision of
care under state law. It further argues that the distinction
between quantity of care or benefit determinations and decisions
about the quality of care is unclear among the courts, and Con-
gress must step in to amend ERISA and resolve the confusion.
II. ERISA
A. Overview of ERISA
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)27 in response to: (1) a growing number of
participants affected by employee welfare benefit and pension ben-
efit plans; (2) mismanagement of employee welfare benefit and
pension benefit plans; and (3) ineffective legislation to prevent
mismanagement of these plans.28 Beginning in the 1940s, there
was an increasing number of employee benefit plans, 29 and by
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (concluding that ERISA civil
enforcement remedies are intended to be the exclusive remedies under such
plans); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)
(noting that "carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a)
of the statute as finally enacted.., provide strong evidence that Congress did not
intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly"). See also Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section
502(a), 45 ALA. L. REV. 631, 637-640 (1994).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
28. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3-4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4642. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
29. "Employee benefit plans" include both pension and welfare plans. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
19981 297
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1970, employee benefit plans covered over 30 million employees. °
Frequently, employees who were the beneficiaries of these pension
and welfare benefit plans worked for many years only to discover
at retirement that their benefits had been mismanaged and some-
times had not vested.3 1 Because ERISA had not yet been enacted,
however, these employees relying on state common law to obtain
their benefits, particularly state contract and trust law,3 2 encoun-
tered judicial difficulties which prevented them from recovering
funds.3 3 Thus, the motivation behind ERISA was to eliminate
many of the barriers facing a plaintiff in trying to recover bene-
fits. 34 Specifically, ERISA's purpose was to protect "the well-being
and security of millions of employees and their dependents" by
"requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and benefi-
ciaries of financial and other information," and "providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
Courts."3 5 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has observed
30. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4641.
31. Craig Stephens, ERISA: The Inevitable But Unexpected Hurdles of the
Plaintiffs Welfare Benefit Plan, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 151, 151 (1996) (citing
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that
employees suffered from abuses in the administration and investment of
employee welfare benefit and private benefit plans)). See also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a) (1994).
32. Stephens, supra note 31, at 151. See also Audio Fidelity Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 624 F.2d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 1980); Hoefel v. Atlas Tack
Corp., 581 F.2d 1, 4-7 (1st Cir. 1978). See also Jay Conison, ERISA and the
Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 619, 641-645 (1994) (discussing pre-
ERISA bodies of federal pension plan law, including tax law, the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act of 1958, state contract law, and state trust law); George L. Flint, Jr., ERISA:
Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARiz. L. REV.
611, 611, 649-55 (1994) (noting that recovery for denied benefits was primarily
enforced through state contract and trust law).
33. Stephens, supra note 31, at 151 (citing Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 310
(6th Cir. 1974); Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944)). See also
Conison, supra note 32, at 645 (noting that contract law "was limited and weak,
affording very few protections to participants," and that trust law "was not
specially adapted to plans and gave little protection to participants"); Flint,
supra note 32, at 611 n.6 (citing Lewis v. Jackson & Squire, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 354,
359-60 (W.D. Ark. 1949); Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App.
1935); Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139, 143 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1937); David v. Veitscher Magnesitwerke Actien Gesellschaft, 35 A.2d
346, 349 (Pa. 1944)).
34. Stephens, supra note 31, at 151.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) & (b) (1994).
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that ERISA was enacted as a "comprehensive statute designed to
promote the interest of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans."36
ERISA is composed of five subchapters containing both regu-
latory and enforcement provisions7.3  The regulatory provisions
require reporting and disclosure, 38 and establish standards for
minimum vesting, fiscal responsibility,39 and fiduciary duties.4 °
ERISA's enforcement sections provide judicial remedies to recover
benefits due, enforce rights, or clarify rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan. 41 The enforcement sections also
enable a plaintiff to seek state law remedies in either state or fed-
eral court.42 Finally, the enforcement sections include a preemp-
tion provision which states that the Act shall "supersede any and
all state laws insofar as they may now or thereafter relate to any
"143employee benefit plan ....
B. ERISA Preemption
ERISA's broad preemption clause, found in § 514(a), provides
that the Act "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
1003(b) of this title."44 The preemption clause expresses Congress'
view that employee benefit plans should be regulated by the fed-
eral government without state involvement.45 Congress, then, can
simplify the administration of employee benefit plans by adminis-
tering them under a single body of federal law. Specifically, the
36. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). See also Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981); Nachman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361-362 (1980).
37. See Jolee Ann Hancock, Diseased Federalism: State Health Care Laws
Fall Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 383, 387 (1995) (summarizing
ERISA provisions).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (1994).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
42. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e) (West Supp. 1996).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
44. § 1144(a).
45. Frank Coan, Jr., You Can't Get There From Here - Questioning the Erosion
of ERISA Preemption in Medical Malpractice Actions Against HMOs, 30 GA. L.
REV. 1023, 1038 (1996) (citing William J. Kilbert & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of
State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section
514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (1984)).
1998] 299
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purpose of ERISA's preemption clause is "to ensure that plans and
plan sponsors [are] subject to a uniform body of law; the goal [is]
to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying
with conflicting directives among States or between States and
the Federal Government."46
Because Congress used such broad language in defining
ERISA's preemption clause,47 particularly in defining the terms
"state law"48 and "relate to,"4' ERISA's scope has caused much
debate. This debate is most widely seen in the field of vicarious
and direct liability medical malpractice claims. HMOs, one of the
most common types of managed care organizations, ° frequently
use ERISA preemption to limit or sometimes escape medical mal-
practice liability altogether. Although all courts have allowed
ERISA preemption of direct liability medical malpractice claims,51
courts are undecided on whether ERISA preempts state law
claims that hold a health plan, generally an HMO, vicariously lia-
ble for medical malpractice of physicians.52 This issue is crucial,
46. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).
47. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (noting that "[the
preemption clause is conspicuous for its breadth"); Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S.
at 137 (noting that Congress drafted ERISA's preemption clause in broad terms).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1), which describes ERISA's definition of state law
as "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect
of law of any State." See also F. Christopher Wethly, New York Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: Vicarious Liability
Malpractice Claims Against Managed Care Organizations Escaping ERISA's
Grasp, 37 B.C.L. REV. 813, 827 (1996) (noting that the term, "state law," found in
ERISA's preemption clause includes common law causes of action, such as direct
and vicarious liability claims, and state statutes).
49. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (explaining the meaning and
relevance of the phrase "relate to").
50. Seema R. Shah, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical
Malpractice Claims: A Response to Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 1545, 1548 (1996) (citing BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAw § 6-2 at
308-09 (1995) and discussing the continuing rise of the HMO).
51. See infra note 83.
52. Several courts have held that vicarious liability claims are not preempted
by ERISA. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Pacificare of
Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hosp.,
No. CIV.A.95-7816, 1996 WL 220979 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996); Jackson v.
Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875
F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ill. 1994); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.
Fla. 1994); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
Burke v. Smithkline Bio-Science Labs, 858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1994);
Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Smith v. HMO Great
300 [Vol. 20:293
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considering that there are approximately 120 million Americans
whose medical care is paid for through ERISA-covered plans spon-
sored by their employers. 53 Preemption serves as a complete bar
to all state claims and allows an HMO to remove an action to fed-
eral court.54 Since ERISA does not entitle one to a jury trial or
enable one to recover compensatory or punitive damages for
injury, preemption essentially denies a malpractice cause of
action. 55
There is a distinction between the jurisdictional doctrine of
complete preemption under section 502(a) and federal preemption
under section 514(a).56 Complete preemption is required when a
state law claim cannot be decided without an interpretation of an
ERISA health plan.57 Only those claims which are subject to com-
plete preemption under ERISA's civil enforcement provision, sec-
tion 502(a)(1)(B), are a basis for removal to federal court.5 8 When
a claim is not completely removable, the district court cannot
decide the issue of ERISA preemption.5 9 The case then falls to the
state court on remand to determine whether the claim is pre-
empted under section 514(a).6 °
Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia
College of Osteopathic Med. Parkview Div., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990). However,
other courts have held that vicarious liability claims are preempted by ERISA.
See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md.
1994); Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare
HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316
(D.N.J. 1993); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. Conn.
1990).
53. Employee Benefit Research Institute, EBRI Issue Brief No. 170, Sources
of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured (March 1995). (On file
in Law Review Office.).
54. Coan, supra note 45, at 1035 (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE
LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 468 (3d ed. 1994)).
55. Id. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing the remedy
an injured plaintiff has under an ERISA plan, which is essentially the amount of
benefits that were denied to him).
56. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355 (noting that when a claim is completely preempted
under § 502(a), it is necessarily preempted under § 514(a); however, the opposite
is not true).
57. Rice, 65 F.3d at 646 (holding the plaintiffs claim not completely
preempted because the claim "does not rest upon the terms of an ERISA plan,
and it can be resolved without interpreting an ERISA plan").
58. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
59. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355.
60. Id.
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III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN QUALITY AND
QUANTITY OF CARE
Courts determining whether an HMO may be directly or
vicariously liable for negligence in the treatment of patients
enrolled in ERISA plans have focused on the distinction between a
claim that a patient received poor quality of care from a physician
and a claim that involves quantity of care or a denial of plan bene-
fits. The general rule is that ERISA does not preempt:
'laws of general application - not specifically targeting ERISA
plans - that involve traditional areas of state regulation and do not
affect relations among the principal ERISA entities.' 'As long as
a state law does not affect the structure, the administration, or the
type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan, the mere fact that the
law has some economic impact on the plan does not require that
the law be invalidated.' 62
In other words, state laws of general application with a lim-
ited or indirect economic effect on ERISA plans do not "relate to"
ERISA plans.63 A state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan
only if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.6 4
Thus, claims which are not related or are indirectly related to
employee benefit plans, essentially claims concerning the quality
of care, are not preempted by ERISA.
However, when a plan beneficiary claims that he or she was
injured because a managed care organization was negligent in
administering the benefits provided under an employee benefit
plan or denied a promised benefit altogether, the claim is pre-
empted.65 ERISA preemption exists for these claims regarding
61. Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefit Serv., 28 F.3d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir.
1994) (quoting Nat'l Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1559 (10th
Cir. 1992))).
62. Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 154 (quoting Airparts, 28 F.3d at 1065).
63. See supra note 43 (defining ERISA's preemption language as
"supersed[ing] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan"). See also Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency &
Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988) (holding that "run-of-the mill state-law claims
such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an
ERISA plan are relatively commonplace," and are not preempted by ERISA);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983) (holding that some
state law causes of action "affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or
peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan").
64. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.
65. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d
298 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the actions of Lincoln National Health Plan of
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quantity of care, because they involve referencing the plan to
determine what was promised.66 Indeed, ERISA, in section
502(a)(1)(B), specifically states that claims "to recover benefits due
... under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify . . .rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan" are preempted.67
Although this distinction between quality and quantity of
benefits seems clear, its scope is confusing, and it has been
unevenly applied by the courts.68 For example, in Dukes v. U.S.
HealthCare, Inc.,69 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit noted the confusion between constructions of quan-
tity of benefits due under a welfare benefit plan and the quality of
those benefits by stating:
the distinction between the quantity of benefits due under a wel-
fare plan and the quality of those benefits will not always be clear
in situations .. .where the benefit contracted for is health care
services rather than money to pay for such services. There well
may be cases in which the quality of a patient's medical care or the
skills of the personnel provided to administer that care will be so
low that the treatment received simply will not qualify as health
care at all. In such a case, it well may be appropriate to conclude
that the plan participant or beneficiary has been denied benefits
due underthe plan.70
In other words, if a patient's care is so poor that it qualifies as
a denial of benefits, then ERISA will preempt a medical malprac-
tice claim. This seems to leave the most injured plaintiffs with no
remedy at all.
IV. STATE COMMON LAW THEORIES OF LIABILITY OF MANAGED
CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Individuals or entities failing to exercise reasonable care in
the medical treatment of patients can be held liable for patient
Kansas City in refusing to pre-approve heart surgery amounted to a denial of
benefits, and, thus, the plaintiffs claims were preempted by ERISA).
66. See Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356-358 (3d Cir. 1995).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1974).
68. See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., 117 S. Ct. 832, 843 (1997) (noting that "applying the 'relate to' provision
according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone
philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else").
69. 57 F.3d 350.
70. Id. at 358.
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injuries caused by their negligent actions. 71 Thus, when a health
maintenance organization commits malpractice through its own
negligence or through the negligence of one of its physicians, state
common law theories of liability permit recovery to those
injured.v2 Claims asserting HMO liability for medical malpractice
injuries fall into two main categories: vicarious liability and direct
liability.73
Health maintenance organizations are vicariously liable for
the negligence of their employees either under the theory of
respondeat superior or that of ostensible agency.74 The doctrine of
respondeat superior is an ancient phrase literally meaning, "let
the master answer" for the torts of his servants.v5 In the HMO
context, a plaintiff under a respondeat superior theory must prove
that the physician health care provider acted negligently in treat-
ing the patient, that a master-servant relationship existed
between the HMO and the physician, and that the physician's tor-
tious behavior fell within the scope of his employment.7 6 Simi-
larly, under the doctrine of agency or ostensible agency, HMOs
may be held liable for the negligence of their agents or of those
who are held out to be their agents.7 7 Under this theory, HMOs
will be liable when a patient looks to the HMO for treatment
instead of the health care provider, and when the managed care
organization "holds out" the health care provider as its
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (stating that "the
standard of conduct to which [one] must conform to avoid being negligent is that
of a reasonable man under like circumstances"). See also Brown v. Kendall, 60
Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850) (holding an actor liable for negligence if he fails to
exercise ordinary care).
72. Wethly, supra note 48, at 821 (citing Sloan v. Metropolitan Health
Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an HMO may
be liable for the negligent treatment of a staff physician); Boyd v. Albert Einstein
Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that an HMO may
be liable for the negligent treatment of an affiliated physician)).
73. 0. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance
Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA's Impact, 19 NovA L. REv. 1047,
1048-49 (1995). See also William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and
Managed Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 453
(1991).
74. Wethly, supra note 48, at 821.
75. BLACi's LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
76. Chittenden, supra note 73, at 453-54 (referring to W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 140 (1965).
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employee.7" These two doctrines impose vicarious liability on an
HMO, because the organization controls the physician providers
who actually commit the legal wrong.
Organizations can also be directly liable for their own negli-
gent acts and omissions under one of two main theories: the corpo-
rate negligence doctrine and liability arising from cost-
containment systems or utilization review. 79 The doctrine of cor-
porate negligence is used to insure that hospitals exercise reason-
able care in retaining and selecting competent physicians.8 °
Liability arising from cost-containment systems, on the other
hand, is imposed when managed care organizations, in order to
receive certain incentives, refrain from ordering tests or treat-
ments within the accepted standards of medical care."' In a cost-
containment system, medical services are reviewed before being
administered to patients to ascertain whether less costly treat-
ment and tests are available.8 2
A. Direct Liability Claims
All courts that have addressed this issue have held that
ERISA preempts direct liability claims against HMOs for corpo-
rate negligence in the selection and retention of physicians as well
as for negligence arising from cost-containment systems or utiliza-
tion review.8 3 Thus, HMOs have successfully raised ERISA pre-
emption as a defense in medical malpractice cases based on direct
negligence. Because these suits are seen as an attack on the
administration of benefits, the courts have decided that these
claims "relate to" the plan and thus fall within the scope of ERISA
78. Chittenden, supra note 73, at 453-54. See also Wethly, supra note 48, at
821.
79. Zamora, supra note 73, at 1053.
80. Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (Wash. 1984).
81. Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 393-94 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979).
82. Zamora, supra note 73, at 1055 (citing Robert C. Macaulay, Health. Care
Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice: On a Collision Course, 21 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 91 (1987)).
83. Five circuit courts of appeals have found ERISA preemption for direct
liability claims. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th
Cir. 1996); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Spain v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health
Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United
HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
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preemption. In other words, such suits relate to the "quantity of
care" provided under a welfare benefit plan.
One of several important federal cases in this area is Kuhl v.
Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc."4 In this case,
Buddy Kuhl suffered a heart attack on April 29, 1989.85 Mr. Kuhl
was an employee of Belger Cartage Services, Inc. and received
medical benefits under an employee welfare benefit plan adminis-
tered by Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc. 6 Phy-
sicians examining Mr. Kuhl determined that he needed
immediate heart surgery8 7 This heart surgery could only be per-
formed at Barnes Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri since Mr. Kuhl's
employee group health plan in Kansas City did not have the nec-
essary facilities or as much success and experience with heart sur-
gery as did Barnes Hospital."5 The Lincoln Health Plan, however,
refused to precertify Mr. Kuhl for the required procedures,
because Barnes Hospital in St. Louis was not in its service area.8 9
Accordingly, Barnes Hospital canceled Mr. Kuhl's July 6, 1989
surgery. 90 The surgical team at Barnes Hospital was not avail-
able for another surgery until September 1989.9" However, by
September 1989 after Lincoln National had finally approved sur-
gery at Barnes Hospital, Mr. Kuhl's heart had deteriorated to the
point where he could no longer withstand surgery; thus, a heart
transplant at Barnes Hospital was recommended by physicians. 92
In addition to refusing Mr. Kuhl's precertification for necessary
heart procedures earlier that year, Lincoln Health Plan refused to
precertify payment for the recommended heart transplant.9 3 Mr.
Kuhl, sadly, died waiting for a heart transplant. 94
84. 999 F.2d 298.
85. Id. at 300.
86. Id. at 299-300. Lincoln National Health Plan is an independent HMO
which pays for medical services to Belger employees under Belger's Group
Health Plan. Id. The Belger Group Health Plan is an employee welfare benefit
plan governed by ERISA. Id.
87. Id. at 300.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 299-300. Lincoln National Health Plan's service area is Kansas
City, and it is not obligated under its contract with Belger Cartage Services, Inc.
to pay for medical services administered outside of this area. Id.
90. Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 300.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Mr. Kuhl's family sued the health plan for medical malprac-
tice, emotional distress, tortious interference with Mr. Kuhl's
right to contract for medical care, and a breach of contract through
Mr. Kuhl as a third party beneficiary.95 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that their claims were all
based on Lincoln's misconduct in delaying Mr. Kuhl's heart sur-
gery in St. Louis. 96 However, the court ruled that the claims were
a denial of benefits or improper processing of benefits under the
Belger Plan, which is exactly the type of claim that ERISA
preempts.9" In other words, the court found that Lincoln did not
administer medical advice, but instead made a benefit determina-
tion - refusal to pre-approve heart surgery. The court in its deci-
sion recognized that preventing HMOs from preempting state law
remedies would actually deter poor precertification decisions and
questionable insurance practices, such as those exhibited by Lin-
coln Health Plan in this case.9" However, without any interven-
tion by Congress to modify ERISA preemption, the court
ultimately left the Kuhl family without a remedy. 99
Another example of ERISA preemption of direct liability
claims can be seen in Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.10 0 Flo-
rence Corcoran had a high-risk pregnancy in early 1989, and close
to her delivery date, her physician, Dr. Collins, ordered her hospi-
talized so that he could continuously monitor the fetus.1° ' Mrs.
Corcoran's health plan, South Central Bell Telephone Company
Medical Assistance Plan, required all hospitalizations to be
approved in advance. 0 2 Thus, Dr. Collins sought precertification
from United HealthCare (United), a utilization review company,
for Mrs. Corcoran's hospitalization."0 3 United denied Dr. Collin's
95. Id.
96. Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 304 (observing "the obvious salutary effect that imposing state law
liability on Lincoln National might have on deterring poor pre-certification
decisions").
99. Id.
100. 965 F.2d 1321.
101. Id. at 1322-23.
102. Id. at 1323. Mrs. Corcoran is a member of the Medical Assistance Plan
through her employer South Central Bell Telephone Company. Id. The Medical
Assistance Plan is a welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA and administered
by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama pursuant to a contract between Blue
Cross and South Central Bell. Id.
103. Id. at 1323-24.
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request stating that hospitalization was not necessary. 104
Instead, United authorized 10 hours per day of home nursing
care.' °5 During a time when there was no nurse on duty, the fetus
went into distress and died.1°6
Mrs. Corcoran and her husband sued United under state
medical malpractice law for causing the wrongful death of their
baby by negligently determining that only home nursing care
rather than hospital care was necessary.' ° The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that United had made
medical decisions, but determined that those medical decisions
were made in the context of making a decision about the availabil-
ity of benefits. 1 8 Thus, the court ruled that the Corcoran's wrong-
ful death claim "related to" the employee benefit plan because it
involved a benefit determination and was preempted by ERISA. 109
The court, though, seemed dissatisfied with its ruling, concluding
that, "the result ERISA compels us to reach means that the
Corcorans have no remedy state or federal, for what may have
been a serious mistake. This is troubling .... 10
The court in Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc."' issued the
same result as in both the Kuhl and Corcoran cases. There,
Henry Tolton committed suicide after his employee benefit plan
administrator denied him psychiatric benefits prior to utilization
review.112 As an employee of United Way, Mr. Tolton received
mental health benefits under the Exclusive Provider Plan, an
employee benefit plan, provided by American Biodyne, Inc."' The
court found that the Tolton family's claims of wrongful death,
improper refusal to authorize benefits, medical malpractice, and
insurance bad faith were the result of American Biodyne's denial
of certain psychiatric benefits under the Exclusive Provider
104. Id. at 1324.
105. Id.
106. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1331.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1338.
111. 48 F.3d 937.
112. Id. at 940.
113. Id. at 939-40. The Exclusive Provider Plan is governed by ERISA. Id.
The benefits under the plan are provided to plan participants like Mr. Tolton
pursuant to a contract between Cigna Health Plan of Ohio, Inc. and American
Biodyne. Id.
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Plan." 4 Yet, the court ruled that American Biodyne's benefit
determinations related to the employee benefit plan and were pre-
empted by ERISA."15 The fact that Mr. Tolton was refused bene-
fits prior to utilization review did not change the court's analysis,
since the court found that American Biodyne was only determin-
ing what benefits were available to Mr. Tolton under the plan."16
The results in these cases and other similar cases asserting
direct liability claims for HMO negligence is troubling. It appears
that the courts could have just as easily concluded that the actions
by the defendant organizations were medical decisions not pre-
empted by ERISA, instead of ruling that the actions involved ben-
efit determinations. A court could make such a conclusion,
seemingly, because a decision that a service is medically necessary
for purposes of quantity of care or determining benefits is also a
decision that the service is medically sufficient for purposes of
quality patient care.
B. Vicarious Liability Claims
Five out of twelve circuit courts of appeals and several lower
courts have found that HMOs may be vicariously liable for the
malpractice of their employees and agents, even if the injured
plaintiff was enrolled in an ERISA plan."17 The federal and state
courts reviewing this issue have held that patients who have been
injured by negligent treatment decisions controlled, arranged for,
or provided by health plans, should be permitted to pursue state
remedies for negligence against those managed care organiza-
tions. These courts have held that ERISA was not intended to bar
injured patients from seeking traditional state law remedies
against managed care organizations that have negligently con-
trolled or arranged for their medical treatment.
In Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage,"8 the Federal
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that ERISA did not
114. Id. at 942. For instance, Mr. Tolton's psychologists prescribed outpatient
treatment and a challenge policy in which Mr. Tolton was to return for treatment
only if he met the "challenge" of remaining off drugs for five days. Id. at 940.
Physicians following Biodyne's policies recommended this treatment even after
Mr. Tolton expressed serious suicidal thoughts, requested inpatient care, and
expressed a dislike for Biodyne's challenge policy. Id.
115. Id. at 942.
116. Id.
117. Julie Johnsson, Supreme Court, Texas Law Strike Blows at ERISA, AM.
MED. NEWS, June 23, 1997, at 8. See supra note 52 for a listing of these cases.
118. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
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preempt a claim of vicarious liability for malpractice against a
managed care organization, therefore becoming the first circuit
court to rule on this issue. 119 In Pacificare, the plaintiffs brought
suit against HMO, Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc., claiming both
vicarious liability for the malpractice of physician Dr. Goen in the
wrongful death of their mother, and direct liability for Pacificare's
negligent and fraudulent administration of an employee benefit
plan.120 The court ruled that the plaintiffs' vicarious liability
medical malpractice claim was not preempted by ERISA, because
it did not sufficiently relate to an ERISA plan.12 ' The vicarious
liability claim, therefore, was remanded to state court for resolu-
tion. 1 22 The court noted that in regards to vicarious liability
claims against HMOs for the malpractice of their physicians, it is
not necessary to reference a benefit plan to determine the issue of
a physician's negligence in treating a patient.123 The court contin-
ued to observe that any reference to a benefit plan in deciding
whether an agency relationship exists between an HMO and the
physician is too tenuous a relationship to the plan to warrant pre-
emption.' 24 Neither is the effect of liability on the benefit plan
enough to warrant preemption.
125
In another case, Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hospital,'26 the
United States Federal Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania held that a beneficiary's claims of vicarious liability
against a managed care organization were not completely pre-
empted by ERISA, because the claims were based upon when an
ultrasound test was supposed to have been performed, not on
whether it would have been authorized by the managed care
organization. 1 27 The plaintiffs alleged that, due to the managed
119. Id. at 153.
120. Id. at 154.
121. Id. Instead, the claim only alleged that physician Dr. Goen was negligent
in treating the plaintiffs' mother and that HMO Pacificare held out Dr. Goen as
its agent. Id.
122. Id. at 155.
123. Id. at 154. Rather, that determination "requires evidence of what
transpired between the patient and physician and an assessment of whether in
providing admittedly covered treatment or giving professional advice the
physician possessed and utilized the knowledge, skill and care usually had and
exercised by physicians in his community or medical specialty." Id.
124. Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 154.
125. Id.
126. No. CIV.A.95-7816, 1996 WL 220979 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996).
127. Id. at *3.
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care organization protocols, an ultrasound, ordered by the plain-
tiffs obstetrician to diagnose whether the fetus was at risk due to
its large size, was delayed for three days. 2 ' During the delay, the
plaintiff mother went into labor. 129 The baby suffered brachial
plexus injury due to shoulder dystocia, which allegedly could have
been avoided had the baby's size been appreciated via ultrasound
prior to delivery. 130 The court observed the plaintiffs allegation,
that the test was untimely due to the delay occasioned by the
managed care policies, related to USHC's role in "arranging for
medical treatment" and not to its "role in determining whether to
approve or disapprove the benefit."' 31 Therefore, the claims were
not preempted.132
In Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc. , the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit also found that ERISA did not
preempt Darryl Dukes' vicarious liability malpractice claim
against U.S. HealthCare.13 4 Mr. Dukes' primary care physician,
Dr. William Banks, identified an ear problem, performed surgery,
and ordered blood studies to be performed, but Germantown Hos-
pital refused to perform the tests.135 Mr. Dukes sought treatment
the next day from another physician, Dr. Edward Hosten, who
also ordered blood tests.136 Although the tests this time were
administered, Mr. Dukes condition worsened, and he died soon
thereafter with an extremely high blood sugar level that could
have been diagnosed by a timely blood test.137
Mr. Dukes' wife sued the physicians, Germantown Hospital,
and U.S. HealthCare in state court for medical malpractice. 13
Mr. Dukes' membership in his HMO, United States Health Care
Systems of Pennsylvania, was paid for by an ERISA plan through
his employer. 139 Mrs. Dukes alleged vicarious liability against
128. Id. at *1.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *3.
132. Kampmeier, 1996 WL 220979, at *3.
133. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 361.
135. Id. at 352.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352. HMO United States Health Care Systems of
Pennsylvania is organized under U.S. HealthCare. Id.
1998] 311
19
Easley: A Call to Congress to Amend ERISA Preemption of HMO Medical Malpr
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1998
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
U.S. HealthCare under an ostensible agency theory. 4 ' Mrs.
Dukes also claimed direct liability against the HMO for failing "to
exercise reasonable care in selecting, monitoring, and evaluating"
the physician providers.' 41
The district court dismissed both vicarious and direct liability
claims stating that they were "related to" the employee benefit
plan and were therefore preempted by ERISA.'4 2 Mrs. Dukes
appealed and the Third Circuit reversed the ruling regarding the
vicarious liability claim. 14 3 The court found that Mrs. Dukes was
not asserting that the HMO withheld benefits due under the
plan. M Instead, Mrs. Dukes was complaining of the low quality
of the benefit that was actually received. 145 The court observed
that the ERISA statute says nothing about the quality of benefit
received, but only provides a remedy for benefits not received. 146
Therefore, the court did not preempt Mrs. Dukes' state law rem-
edy for U.S. HealthCare's negligence in its provision of quality of
care. 1
47
Although the rulings in the aforementioned cases seem prom-
ising, these courts have only opened the door to preserving state
health care regulation. The rulings are not without loopholes.
Even Dukes could not completely rule on preemption. For
instance, the court commented that HMOs may impliedly promise
that their physicians or services will be of acceptable quality.'8
The court continued to observe that if the promise was found to be
a contractual benefit, any claim that the services provided were
not of acceptable quality might be considered a claim that benefits
were denied, which could be preempted by ERISA. 149
In fact, several rulings have allowed preemption of vicarious
liability claims. 150 Take the case of Ricci v. Gooberman,1 1 for
instance. In this case, Christine Ricci brought suit against the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 353.
143. Id. at 361. The vicarious liability claim, then, was remanded to state
court for resolution of whether it is preempted under ERISA § 514(a). Id.
144. Id. at 356.
145. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 356.
148. Id. at 359.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 52 for a listing of these cases.
151. 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993).
312 [Vol. 20:293
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol20/iss2/3
HMO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
HMO, U.S. Healthcare, for the negligence of physicians in failing
to advise her of certain abnormalities on a mammogram, and for
performing and evaluating her mammogram in a careless, reck-
less and negligent manner. 152 Christine Ricci received medical
care benefits from U.S. Healthcare which furnished employee
health care benefits for her employer under ERISA. 153  The
United States District Court in this matter held that the vicarious
liability claims were preempted by ERISA.'5 4 The court gave sev-
eral reasons for its conclusion. Notably, the court decided that to
deny preemption in vicarious liability claims while allowing pre-
emption in direct negligence claims would lead to conflicting
results by allowing "decreasing HMO liability in correlation with
the extent of its involvement in providing care."15 5 Therefore, the
court decided the best solution would be to preempt all medical
malpractice claims. The court also ruled that "denying preemp-
tion in vicarious liability cases against HMOs .. .requires that
both the provider and the HMO carry liability insurance for the
acts of the provider, resulting in higher costs that certainly trickle
down to plan beneficiaries."56 Finally, the court felt that it was
ultimately up to Congress to clarify the scope of ERISA preemp-
tion, not the courts. 157
The Ricci holding is inaccurate on two grounds. First, con-
flicting results will actually be caused by preempting both direct
and vicarious liability claims for medical malpractice. Managed
care organizations actively make medical decisions; thus, it logi-
cally follows, they should be held liable for their control and influ-
ence. To hold otherwise would allow managed care organizations
to take no responsibility for their medical decisions and to escape
liability for their negligent actions. This is clearly unacceptable.
Secondly, the court and managed care organizations argue
that by subjecting managed care organizations to liability, these
organizations will be forced to increase their expenditures, in turn
causing them to drastically raise premiums and reduce benefits
for patients. However, liability for such wrongs comes with the
territory in all professions. It is an ordinary cost of doing busi-
ness. Furthermore, the managed care organization is in a better
152. Id. at 316.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 318.
155. Id. at 317-18.
156. Id. at 318.
157. Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 318.
19981 313
21
Easley: A Call to Congress to Amend ERISA Preemption of HMO Medical Malpr
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1998
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
position than the patient to ward against the loss. Patients do not
choose their insurance plans; instead their employers do.' 58 Thus,
"it cannot be said that they are freely entering into a contract by
which they should be bound," and it cannot be argued that
patients are assuming the risk.159
Although Dukes ruled that Mrs. Dukes' vicarious liability
claim were not preempted under ERISA, the court cautioned that
preemption may apply in cases where the quality of care is
extremely low and in contractual cases where HMOs promise cer-
tain benefits in treating patients. Furthermore, some cases have
ruled that all vicarious liability claims are preempted. As one
judge aptly noted, "the split among courts exemplifies the diffi-
culty this preemption issue presents." 6 ° Courts, however, should
continue to look at decisions such as Pacificare and Kampmeier as
models, for the Ricci holding and others like it fail.
V. HMOs' ROLE IN DECISION MAKING
Today, HMOs no longer just pay the bills for covered services.
Many actively manage patient care and control or influence medi-
cal treatment decisions. 16 ' Because these health plans now
actively control, arrange for, and manage the quality of medical
treatment made available to patients, it has become difficult, if
not impossible, to separate vicarious from direct liability for
patient care.' 62 Mistakenly, courts have often ruled that managed
care medical decisions involve quantity of care or administration
of benefits rather than quality patient care. The more responsibil-
ity managed care organizations take in providing quality care to
patients, the more they should be held accountable under the doc-
trines of direct and vicarious liability for their negligence in pro-
viding these services.
HMOs are also involved in medical decision making through
their establishment of financing incentive programs. By giving
incentives to physicians for avoiding costly treatments and sur-
geries, HMOs are in effect influencing the decisions made by phy-
158. Wendy K. Mariner, Business v. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for
Managed Care, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236, 240 (1995).
159. Id.
160. Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D. Ill. 1994).
161. See Marsha R. Gold, et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements
Managed-Care Plans Make With Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1678-
1683 (1995).
162. See Mariner, supra note 158, at 236-46.
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sicians concerning the medical treatment of patients. For
example, in Lancaster, discussed in the introduction, bonuses and
profit incentives were given to physicians for not rendering diag-
nostic tests or a neurology consult for eleven-year-old Paige Lan-
caster. 163 Dr. Campbell and Dr. Pauls argued that the Incentive
Program caused them to refrain from administering the full and
adequate care the minor child needed.16 4
Pappas v. Asbel165 provides another example of the involve-
ment of managed care organizations in medical decision making
through the establishment of financing incentive programs. In
this case, Mr. Basile Pappas became a permanent quadriplegic
while his doctors and insurer, U.S. Healthcare, spent more than
four hours arguing over HMO benefit plan policies. 66 Mr. Pappas
was initially admitted to the emergency department at Haverford
Community Hospital in Pennsylvania where after examination
doctors diagnosed him as suffering from a neurological emergency,
specifically a cervical epidural abscess which was compressing his
spinal cord.' 67 Haverford Hospital's physicians were certain of
the treatment required to remedy Mr. Pappas' condition. They
wanted Mr. Pappas immediately transferred to the Spinal Cord
Trauma Center at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital which
had both available beds and surgical specialists skilled in the pro-
cedure Mr. Pappas needed. 168
However, Thomas Jefferson did not contract with Mr. Pap-
pas's insurer, U.S. Healthcare.169 The HMO refused to authorize
his transfer and instead required the physicians to move Mr. Pap-
pas to a hospital in the U.S. Healthcare provider network.17 0 For
more than four hours, doctors negotiated with the HMO and two
of its approved hospitals concerning Mr. Pappas' transfer and
care.' 7 ' When the doctors and the HMO finally obtained authori-
zation to transfer him to the Medical College of Pennsylvania, Mr.
Pappas' condition had already deteriorated to quadriplegia. 172
163. Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958
F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (E.D. Va. 1997).
164. Id.
165. 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1996).
166. Id. at 713.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Pappas, 675 A.2d at 713.
172. Id.
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Cost-containment in this case was the motivation behind
USHC's medical decision to refuse transfer of Mr. Pappas to Jef-
ferson Hospital.173 USCH is a for-profit managed care organiza-
tion and many of its medical decisions are often aimed at
increasing its own profits.174 Here, USHC negligently eliminated
the most effective and readily available source of care for Mr. Pap-
pas and in effect tied the hands of his physicians who had already
planned the best and quickest course of treatment for his neuro-
logical emergency. The court even noted that, "[diecisions such as
that made by USHC concerning where Mr. Pappas might receive
treatment are propelled by dollar savings, not the protection of
worker's rights, in this case the right to the most effective medical
care, which was the original focus of ERISA."175 The managed
care organization's profit-oriented decisions and cost containment
protocols in Lancaster, Pappas, and many other cases interfere
with the quality of health care which treating physicians are able
to provide to patients.
VI. RECENT LEGISLATION REGARDING HMO LIABILITY
Federal lawmakers are currently debating new legislation
that would clarify much of the confusion surrounding ERISA pen-
sion law. The bill entitled the "Patient Access to Responsible Care
Act of 1997" essentially "offer[s] patients access to due process and
avenues of appeal, ensure [s] that patients have access to providers
to receive benefits covered by the health plan in a timely manner
and guarantee [s] open communication between patients and prov-
iders."1 7 6 Several groups supporting the ERISA reforms include
the American Medical Association and the Center for Patient
Advocacy.' 77
The relevant sections of the bill are found in § 3, entitled
"Patient Protection Standards Under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974," and in § 4, entitled "Non-Preemp-
tion of State Law Respecting Liability of Group Health Plans."178
173. Id. at 716.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Overman, supra note 1, at 34. See also S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.
1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
177. Geri Aston, Making Managed Care Share Malpractice Risk: Bill Would
Remove Plans' Protection from Liability, AM. MED. NEWS, May 12, 1997, at 3, 72
(1997).
178. S. 644, § 3-4; H.R. 1415, § 3-4.
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Section 3(b) in particular concerns modification of the preemption
standard. 7 s It states that the provisions of section 713, Patient
Protection Standards, found in subpart B of part 7 of subtitle B of
title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
"shall not be construed to preempt any state law, or the enactment
or implementation of such a state law, that provides protections
for individuals that are equivalent to or stricter than the protec-
tions provided under such provisions. "18 Section 4(a) states:
In general - section 514(b) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C. § 1144(b)) is amended by redesig-
nating paragraph (9) as paragraph (10) and inserting the follow-
ing new paragraph: '(9) Subsection (a) of this section shall not be
construed to preclude any state cause of action to recover damages
for personal injury or wrongful death against any person that pro-
vides insurance or administrative services to or for an employee
welfare benefit plan maintained to provide health care
benefits."
8 1
Federal legislators are not the only ones recognizing the need
for ERISA reform. On May 22, 1997, the Texas state Senate
enacted the Managed Care Responsibility Act,'8 2 making Texas
the first state in history to subject HMOs to liability when they act
negligently in treating patients.18 3 Under the new law, HMOs
may be liable if they "fail [ed] to use 'ordinary care' when deciding
whether to pay for a medical procedure." 84 Senator David Sibley,
who introduced the Texas bill, defined the core of the bill as this:
"If the HMOs choose to make medical decisions - stand in the
shoes of the doctor, as it were - they ought to stand in the shoes of
the doctor in court, too."' 8 5 Many say the legislation will likely be
effective because of the fact that it is similar to the vicarious liabil-
ity doctrine already approved by many courts.'" 6
Texas' new law has started a trend in other states. For exam-
ple, Missouri's House Bill 335,87 enacted June 25, 1997, adds
HMOs to the definition of health care provider, holding HMOs
179. S. 644, § 3; H.R. 1415, § 3.
180. Id.
181. S. 644, § 4; H.R. 1415, § 4.
182. S.B. 386, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997).
183. Wayne J. Guglielmo, Sharp Shootin" Texas Doctors Put HMOs in the
Malpractice Target Zone, MED. ECON., December 22, 1997, at 90.
184. Higgins, supra note 25, at 24.
185. Guglielmo, supra note 183, at 90.
186. Johnsson, supra note 117, at 8.
187. H.R. 335, 89th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997).
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accountable for making negligent medical decisions.188 In addi-
tion, similar bills have been proposed in Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, and Rhode Island.189
Yet less than one month after the enactment of Texas' Man-
aged Care Responsibility Act, Aetna Health Plans of Texas and
related companies filed suit in the United States District Court of
the Southern District of Texas challenging the new legislation. 9 '
The HMOs are arguing that ERISA's language invalidates the
Texas law.1 91 Other states will be looking carefully to see whether
the Texas law withstands the ERISA challenge. Even if the chal-
lenge is successful, however, states may still be able to use the
Texas case as a tool for developing different state liability laws
that will be able to withstand attack.
VII. CONCLUSION
HMOs must be held accountable for their negligent actions.
The more responsibility they take in providing medical care and
making medical decisions, the more they should be held accounta-
ble for these duties. Many of these responsibilities, such as utili-
zation or precertification review and cost-containment
considerations, were not even in existence when Congress contem-
plated ERISA. Thus, Congress certainly could not have intended
ERISA to serve as a means for HMOs to escape corporate and
vicarious liability for such actions.
Because of HMOs' greater role in providing medical care,
courts have had difficulty in applying a uniform standard with
regard to ERISA preemption. Judge Birch in his dissenting opin-
ion of Sanson v. General Motors Corp.,1 92 in which the plaintiffs
claim was preempted by ERISA, points to the effect of this prob-
lem. He states, "I do not subscribe to the view that for every
wrong there must necessarily be a remedy. However, where there
is a remedy (here a state fraud action), I find it is difficult to com-
prehend, in a common sense way, how a law enacted to protect the
188. Roselyn Bonati, Texas and Missouri Lead the Way in Protecting HMO
Members, ATLA ADVOCATE PERIODICALS, March 1998 at 3.
189. Bonati, supra note 187, at 8; Guglielmo, supra note 183, at 97; Higgins,
supra note 25, at 24; Johnsson, supra note 117, at 8.
190. Guglielmo, supra note 183, at 98.
191. Id.
192. 966 F.2d 618 (l1th Cir. 1992).
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very class of individuals into which the appellant squarely fits can
be construed to deny him such a preexisting remedy."
193
Congress must take Judge Birch's position and provide a rem-
edy for injured plaintiffs. In addition, other states should follow
Texas' lead in an attempt to resolve the issue of ERISA preemp-
tion. Without this change, HMOs have little incentive to protect
patients from injuries; HMOs can simply shift the risk of such
injuries to physicians and patients that they serve, which leaves
patients like Paige Lancaster with no recourse at all.
Angela M. Easley
193. Id. at 623 n.2.
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